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A Perspective on Carbon Sequestration as a 
Strategy for Mitigating Climate Change
G. Cornelis van Kooten
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol includes, as a strategy for miti-
gating climate change, the option of removing CO2 from 
the atmosphere through biological carbon sequestration. 
This includes activities such as tree planting and land dis-
turbance reduction that are commonly grouped under the 
abbreviation LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry). Perhaps surprisingly, in the decade since 1997, 
such schemes have not been widely or appropriately uti-
lized. However, LULUCF activities should only be includ-
ed in a climate mitigation strategy under very restrictive 
circumstances. The objective in this paper is to bring per-
spective to the role in mitigating climate change of carbon 
sequestration through land use and forestry projects.
While there is no doubt that growing plants and trees 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it in biomass 
or soils, this does not translate into unmitigated support for 
LULUCF as a source of carbon credits. There are many prob-
lems with LULUCF-generated offset credits, including: 
•  Measurement, monitoring and verification are difficult 
and costly; 
•  Carbon  is  not  stored  indefinitely  (terrestrial  carbon 
sinks are ephemeral);
•  The time path of carbon uptake and future release is not 
easy to estimate or evaluate; 
•  Many projects cannot be considered ‘additional’ and 
would likely be implemented in the absence of climate 
concerns; and 
•  Indirect carbon and other greenhouse gas effects (leak-
ages) are generally ignored. 
As a result, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that 
terrestrial projects truly generate the carbon credits that are 
claimed. 
Suspect Sequestration Claims
The claims made by many LULUCF projects are suspect. 
Yet,  many  schemes  claim  to  generate  biologically-based 
carbon offset credits, including:
•  In Australia for $40, Greenfleet will plant trees that “... 
will absorb the greenhouse gases that your car produc-
es”. 
•  In Scotland, Trees for Life uses the idea of a carbon 
footprint to solicit donations for tree planting: it of-
fers “... you the chance to make a real difference and 
become Carbon Conscious.” 
•  The  Haida-Gwaii  First  Nation  in  British  Columbia, 
Canada, intends to remove alder “growing in an un-
natural manner” and replace it with the original mixed 
conifer species of the climax rainforest, partly funding 
the project from the sale of carbon credits.
•  The Little Red River Cree Nation located in Northern 
Alberta, Canada, wished to create carbon permits by 
delaying harvests of forests, but was turned down by the 
Canadian government. 
•  A community group in Powell River, British Columbia, 
hopes to obtain carbon credits to fund activities to pre-
vent the harvest of coastal rainforest. 
There is nothing objectionable about the forgoing proj-
ects, except that, when it comes to claims that climate-
mitigating offset credits are being created, these and many 
other projects are suspect. In some cases, the carbon credit 
angle is largely a marketing technique to solicit funds for a 
project that would proceed in any event. 
Even Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forestry 
activities are suspect. The first approved CDM tree-plant-
ing project establishes 2,000 ha of multiple-use forests on 
degraded lands in China. The CDM report indicates the 
project would sequester 773,842 tCO2 over the 30-year 
project life, but there is no information about the timing 
of CO2 uptake and its possible eventual release. Unless 
one knows how long CO2 stays out of the atmosphere, 
it is impossible to determine how many carbon credits are 
produced. Yet Spain and Italy will each claim a share of the 
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Some Terrestrial Carbon Seques-
tration Costs
Over the past decade, I investigated 
data on carbon uptake and costs from 
several hundred biological sequestra-
tion projects or proposals. Activities 
included soil conservation (e.g., con-
servation  and  zero  tillage,  reduced 
summer fallow), switches from annual 
crops to perennial ones (e.g., forages), 
tree planting schemes (plantations on 
denuded  forestland  and  agricultural 
land), deforestation prevention, and 
forest  management  (enhanced  silvi-
culture). The vast majority of studies 
and project documents fail to iden-
tify how long carbon is sequestered, 
whether the activity would have taken 
place in the absence of concerns about 
global warming, and the leakages that 
the project induces. For example, se-
questered carbon in soils as a result of 
tillage change, reduced fallow or land 
use  conversion  would  be  released 
very quickly once the prior practice 
is reinstated. Nor is the time path of 
carbon accumulation specified. And 
many  studies  ignore  the  increased 
emissions of CO2 or equivalent gases 
related to the increased use of chemi-
cals brought about by practices to en-
hance soil organic carbon – leakages 
are ignored.
It is very difficult to appropriately 
credit terrestrial carbon activities. For 
the vast majority of biological seques-
tration  projects  the  future  path  of 
carbon uptake and release is generally 
unknown and unknowable. There is 
always a risk that carbon will be re-
leased  due  to  unforeseen  hazards, 
such as fire and erosion; and the abil-
ity to measure/monitor actual rates of 
sequestration and associated leakages 
is inadequate. As a result, the transac-
tion costs associated with the creation 
of credits via terrestrial sequestration 
activities are high, militating against 
the  use  of  sequestration  in  carbon 
trading. 
Consider  conservation  tillage.  A 
study by West and Marland (2002) 
found  that  reduced  tillage  did  not 
lower atmospheric CO2, because the 
carbon stored in soil organic matter 
is offset by the CO2 and other green-
house gasses released by increased pro-
duction, transportation and applica-
tion of chemicals. Given the risk that 
carbon stored in soils is released when 
land use or management conditions 
change, reduced tillage may actually 
increase overall CO2 emissions. 
Conversion  to  zero  tillage  is  a 
more promising enterprise. Nonethe-
less, it is not uniformly true that zero 
tillage  sequesters  more  carbon  than 
conventional tillage, since less residue 
is available for conversion to soil or-
ganic carbon in arid regions (Manley 
et al. 2005), which affects the costs 
of creating carbon credits. Some cost 
estimates are provided in Table 1, and 
these omit the possible increased emis-
sions related to greater chemical use 
and  the  transaction  costs  associated 
with  measurement  and  monitoring. 
Even so, given that utility companies 
are banking on carbon credits costing 
no more than $20 per metric ton of 
CO2 as reported in The Economist 
(2007), the cost of generating carbon 
credits by changing agronomic prac-
tices is not very competitive, except 
perhaps in the U.S. South. 
Furthermore  such  practices  may 
not  be  additional  –  farmers  have 
increasingly  adopted  conservation 
tillage  practices,  including  no-till 
cropping, without requiring side pay-
ments for carbon uptake. 
a  distraction  and  even  a  means  of 
unloading climate mitigation onto a 
future generation. First off, as I have 
shown elsewhere (van Kooten 2008), 
it is nearly impossible to determine 
how many carbon credits are actually 
created  due  to  issues  regarding  the 
timing  of  CO2  uptake  and  release, 
measurement,  leakage,  etc.  Second, 
measurement, monitoring and verifi-
cation are difficult and increase trans-
action costs, although these are typi-
cally ignored partly because they are 
difficult to determine. 
An  indication  of  the  potential 
marginal costs of forestry based car-
bon  credits  is  provided  in Table  2, 
which  is  based  on  68  studies  with 
costs again ignoring transaction costs. 
For the most part, forest activities are 
more costly than $20 per t CO2, ex-
cept for tree planting in many tropi-
cal regions, some boreal activities and 
some U.S. projects. The opportunity 
cost of land is generally too high. This 
holds even when account is taken of 
carbon stored in wood products. The 
only exception occurs when trees are 
harvested and burned in place of fos-
sil  fuels  to  generate  electricity,  and 
even then not in all locations. 
Future Commitments
Finally, while a country can use car-
bon sequestration credits to achieve 
some proportion of its current Kyoto 
emissions-reduction target, this may 
create problems for the future if the 
country remains committed to long-
term  climate  mitigation.  Suppose 
a country is committed, in a future 
commitment  period  (a  second  pe-
riod  is  currently  being  negotiated), 
to reduce emissions beyond what it 
committed to for 2008-2012. It must 
then  meet  the  new  target  plus  any 
shortfall from the first commitment 
period;  in  particular,  it  still  needs 
to reduce emissions by the amount 
covered in 2008-2012 by biological 
sink activities. But there is more: the 
country is also technically liable for 
carbon stored in the nonpermanent 
terrestrial sink. 
Table 1. Cost of Creating Carbon 
Credits via Zero Tillage Agriculture, $ 
per metric ton of CO2
Region	 Wheat		 Other	Crops
U.S. South  $3 to $  $½ to $1
Prairies  $10 to >$00  $1 to $
U.S. Corn Belt  $39 to $1  $23 to $2
Source: Adapted from Manley et al. 
(2005)
Given  that  agricultural  carbon 
uptake  activities  are  particularly 
ephemeral, what about forest activi-
ties?  Again,  forest  carbon  sinks  are 
not the answer. If anything, they are 2  CHOICES  1st Quarter 2008 • 23(1) 
Consider the example of a coun-
try that agreed to reduce emissions in 
the first (2008-2012) period by 6% 
and  then  commits  to  reduce  them 
by a further 6% in a second period, 
for an overall reduction of 12% from 
the 1990 baseline emissions. Suppose 
that,  in  the  first  period,  it  reduced 
emissions by 4%, while relying on for-
est sinks to cover the remainder. For 
the second period, therefore, it must 
reduce emissions by 8% rather than 
6% in order to meet the 12% target. 
Furthermore, if and inevitably when 
the terrestrial sink releases its carbon 
to the atmosphere, the country must 
also cover that loss (which amounts to 
2%), implying that it must really re-
duce emissions by 10%. This tempo-
ral shifting in the emissions-reduction 
burden caused by reliance on carbon 
sinks is therefore likely to result in an 
onerous obligation for future genera-
tions.
Concluding Observations
All things considered, I concur with 
Julianna Priskin who states that those 
who intend to be “carbon neutral trav-
elers need to be well-informed about 
carbon credits that finance tree plan-
tations. ... The singular action of tree 
planting will not solve climate change 
problems ... notably because it does 
not lead to a reduction of fossil fuel 
reliance.” The same applies to other 
biological  sequestration,  particularly 
agricultural activities.
Are  we  then  left  with  no  role 
whatsoever for terrestrial carbon se-
questration? On the contrary, plants 
remove  CO2  from  the  atmosphere, 
while providing a host of other ben-
efits. Thus it makes sense to imple-
ment certain environmentally sound 
sequestration  activities.  However,  I 
see no role for biological sequestration 
in a carbon trading scheme given the 
impermanence, volatility and onerous 
transaction costs related to duration, 
measurement and monitoring. 
One possible solution, however, is 
to provide a predetermined schedule 
of  carbon  storage  for  sequestration 
alternatives  and  base  subsidies  and 
penalties on this schedule. A subsidy 
is  provided  while  the  sequestration 
activity continues and a penalty as-
sessed when land use reverts to the 
prior  practice.  Actual  carbon  flux 
need not be monitored or verified as 
carbon flux would be determined by 
the  pre-determined  schedule,  with 
the value of carbon determined in the 
emissions  trading  market.  The  only 
relevant transaction costs relate to the 
establishment  of  a  contract  on  the 
property that covers future landowner 
liability for carbon stored. However, 
I  believe  that  few  would  undertake 
such an agreement since the benefit 
to landowners will likely be too small, 
and the risk that carbon prices and 
resultant liabilities will increase over 
time too large.
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